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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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In these consolidated appeals, Yaroslav Churuk (“Churuk”) and Mykhaylo 
Botsvynyuk (“Mykhaylo”) (collectively “Appellants”)1 appeal from their respective 
convictions for conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise in violation of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).  
Mykhaylo also challenges his sentence.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 On March 17, 2010, a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania returned an indictment against five brothers—Churuk, Mykhaylo, Omelyan 
Botsvynyuk (“Omelyan”), Stepan Botsvynyuk (“Stepan”), and Dmtyro Botsvynyuk 
(“Dmytryo”) (collectively the “Botsvynyuks”).  Count One charged the Botsvynyuks 
with conspiracy to conduct a racketeering enterprise in violation of § 1962(d) (while 
Counts Two and Three charged Omelyan with extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951, and Count Four charged Stepan with Hobbs Act extortion).   
 Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the government” 
(Mykhaylo’s Brief at 9 n.6 (citing United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 284 (3d Cir. 
2007))), Appellants together with their brothers, operated an international human 
trafficking ring (i.e., the “Botsvynyuk Organization”) that recruited young Ukrainian men 
and women to work for them with the promise of good paying jobs and a better life in the 
United States.  Instead, the Botsvynyuk Organization held the workers under conditions 
of peonage and involuntary servitude, using violence and threats of violence to keep them 
                                              
1 The use of first names throughout the opinion is not out of disrespect for any 
individual but to help distinguish family members with the same last name. 
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in line.  These men and women were smuggled into the United States through Mexico.  
They were told that they owed substantial debts for their travel to the United States.  
Once they arrived in Philadelphia, the Botsvynyuk Organization forced the victims to 
work long hours cleaning commercial buildings and private residences and subjected 
them to deplorable living conditions as well as physical and verbal abuse.  Payment for 
their labor went directly to the Botsvynyuk Organization, which also confiscated their 
identification, travel documents, and immigration papers.  When the victims escaped, 
they and their family members were threatened.    
In 2011, a jury found Omelyan and Stepan guilty of RICO conspiracy (and found 
Omelyan guilty on one of the Hobbs Act charges).  In 2012, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced Omelyan to a term of life 
imprisonment on the RICO conspiracy charge and a consecutive term of 240 months’ 
imprisonment for extortion.  Stepan was sentenced to a term of 240 months’ 
imprisonment.  Both brothers appealed their convictions, while Omelyan also challenged 
his sentence.  We affirmed.  See United States v. Botsvynyuk, 552 F. App’x 178 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
Appellants were arrested in Canada and challenged their extradition to the United 
States.  They were extradited in 2012 and were tried in 2015.2 
The jury found Appellants guilty of RICO conspiracy.  The District Court 
sentenced both Churuk and Mykhaylo to 240 months’ imprisonment (as well as three 
                                              
2 Dmytro resides in Ukraine, which does not have an extradition treaty with the 
United States.   
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years of supervised release), and they were ordered to pay restitution in the amount of 
$288,272.28 (jointly and severally with each other and with Omelyan and Stepan).   
II. 
 Appellants raise numerous issues in these consolidated appeals.3  Having 
considered their arguments, the record, and the governing legal principles, we determine 
that the District Court did not commit any reversible error.  On the contrary, it carefully 
and appropriately handled a lengthy and complicated proceeding.  
A. Extraterritoriality  
 Mykhaylo argues that the indictment should have been dismissed because it failed 
to allege that he engaged in criminal activity within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.4  Invoking RICO’s five-year statute of limitations, see 18 U.S.C. § 
3282(a), he also contends that the indictment did not allege any conduct on the part of the 
co-conspirators satisfying both the territorial jurisdiction requirement as well as the 
applicable statute of limitations, i.e., criminal conduct occurring in the United States after 
March 17, 2005 (within the five years preceding the date the indictment was returned).  
We disagree.  
The indictment adequately alleged Appellants were part of a criminal enterprise 
                                              
3 The District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(i), Churuk joins and adopts by 
reference Mykhaylo’s arguments (except for his brother’s sentencing argument).   
4 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and 
review any findings of fact for clear error.  See, e.g.¸United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 
594 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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that was intended to have an effect in the United States and, in fact, involved criminal 
conduct in this country.  In fact, it identified numerous specific acts committed by the co-
conspirators in the United States.  This is not surprising given the fact that the alleged 
forced labor (i.e., the cleaning services) occurred in the United States.  In turn, “the 
government has the power to prosecute every member of a conspiracy that takes place in 
United States territory, even those conspirators who never entered the United States.”  
United States v. Inco Bank & Trust Corp., 845 F.2d 919, 920 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing 
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620-24 (1927); United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 
443, 445 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Correa-Negron, 462 F.2d 613, 614 (9th Cir. 
1972)).  According to the indictment, the RICO conspiracy existed from at least the fall 
of 2000 through in or around the spring of 2007.  In addition to specifying several pre-
2005 acts that occurred in the United States, the indictment alleged criminal conduct in 
Ukraine within the limitations period—specifically threats Omelyan made to Nadia 
Yashuk between 2005 and 2007.  Furthermore, the statute of limitations is not an element 
of the offense, and a RICO conspiracy conviction does not require proof of an overt act 
either within or before the limitations period.5  See, e.g.¸ Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 
106, 111-12 (2013); Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997).  
B. The 2014 Recording 
 The government presented at trial a recording of a telephone call that Omelyan 
                                              
5 At oral argument, counsel for Mykhaylo chose to rest on his briefing on the issue 
of extraterritoriality.  He admitted that he does not have any case for the principle of law 
that, just because his client did not allegedly commit an act in the United States, the 
RICO conspiracy provision could not apply.   
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made in 2014 (from prison) to Yashuk.6  In short, during the call “Omelyan asked 
Yashuk to tell her son [Victor Shakhmarova] and daughter-in-law [M.S.1] to change their 
stories about him and help him.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 17 n.7.)  “Yashuk reminded 
Omelyan about the threats he [had] made to her in the past, and he admitted [or at least 
did not deny] that he made those threats [or someone who called in his name had done 
so] but claimed he would never have acted on them.”7  (Id.)   
Specifically, Yashuk testified about a series of threatening interactions with 
Omelyan, including several incidents that occurred within the statute of limitations 
period.  She testified that, in late 2002, Omelyan called her in Ukraine.  He told her that 
her son and daughter-in-law had escaped.  If she did not tell him where they were, “he 
will have to deal with us, with me and with the granddaughter,” and he would travel to 
Ukraine so that “our unashamed blood will cover us.”  (A366.)  She subsequently 
received another call from someone using a Georgian accent (possibly Omelyan himself) 
who threatened to stab her and her granddaughter.  Omelyan called Yashuk again, saying 
that “I will come and your unashamed blood will cover both you and your 
granddaughter.”  (A369.)   Beginning in 2015, Omelyan visited Yashuk’s home in the 
Ukraine (and on one occasion claimed his brother “Misha” (Mykhaylo) was sitting in the 
car).  Omeylan urged Yashuk to testify for him in a Ukrainian investigation and offered 
                                              
6 We generally review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion while 
exercising plenary review to the extent such rulings are based on an interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 
(3d Cir. 2000).  Whether a statement constitutes hearsay is a question of law subject to 
plenary review, and the application of a hearsay exception is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  See, e.g., United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2006).   
7 Omelyan raped M.S.1.   
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her money to do so.  If she did not, “maybe your granddaughter won’t make it to school 
one day or there might be an accident.”  (A369.)  “He said that if it doesn’t happen, then 
maybe [there would be] an accident or he might give the granddaughter to the prostitution 
house to make money to pay off the debt of the parents.”  (A370.)  According to Yashuk, 
Omelyan approached her in 2007 at a bus stop in Ukraine.  He asked her about her son’s 
whereabouts and said he hoped the son was still healthy so “I can handle him, deal with 
him.”  (A374.)  Appellants vigorously attacked the credibility of the government’s 
witnesses including Yashuk, characterizing them as liars who simply sought visas to 
remain in the United States.   
 The District Court properly overruled Mykhaylo’s hearsay objection, and it 
appropriately determined that this recording was admissible for the limited purpose of 
responding to the defense’s attack on Yashuk’s credibility.  In any event, we believe that, 
even if the District Court erroneously admitted this piece of evidence, its error was 
harmless.   
 Mykhaylo argues that the recording constituted inadmissible hearsay on the 
grounds that it was offered for the truth of the matters asserted in the recording, did not 
fall within any one of the delineated hearsay exceptions, and did not qualify as non-
hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence.  See, e.g., Fed R. Evid. 801(c)(2) (defining 
hearsay as, inter alia, “a statement” that “a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted in the statement”), Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (setting forth categories of 
statements that are not hearsay), Fed. R. Evid. 802 (stating hearsay is not admissible 
unless federal statute, Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by Supreme 
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Court provides otherwise), Fed. R. Evid. 803 (“Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay—
Regardless of Whether the Declarant is Available as a Witness”); Fed. R. Evid. 804 
(“Hearsay Exceptions—When the Declarant is Unavailable as a Witness”).  In particular, 
he insists that the evidence did not rise to the level of an admissible co-conspirator 
statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) (statement is not hearsay if made 
by opposing party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy).  
However, the District Court ultimately indicated that the recording was not admissible as 
a statement by a co-conspirator.  The recording accordingly could not be considered as 
evidence that the conspiracy itself continued into the limitations period.  Instead, the 
District Court indicated that the recording was admissible as “a [purportedly] consistent 
statement confirming the existence of the prior conversation, which you[, the defense,] 
said never happened, but they’re both talking about it.”8  (A1567.)  In other words, it was 
admitted—not for the truth of the matters asserted—but simply to support Yashuk’s 
credibility.  For his part, Mykhaylo does not cite to any case law stating that it would be 
error to admit this sort of evidence for such a limited purpose.  In fact, the District Court 
offered to give a cautionary instruction as part of its final charge to the jury regarding the 
                                              
8 The government also appropriately observes that the recording has certain “built-
in” elements of reliability.  After all, it was Omelyan who called Yashuk, she did not 
know the conversation was being recorded, and she was confronting the person who she 
claimed had repeatedly threatened her and her family.  Omelyan’s statements also would 
appear to be inconsistent with his penal interest.  See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).  Although 
Omelyan claimed that Yashuk’s son and daughter-in-law had lied to get their green cards, 
he still wanted Yashuk to ask them to change their testimony.  When Yashuk confronted 
Omelyan with the various threats he had made, he did not deny he (or someone speaking 
in his name) had made them (and instead essentially said he did not mean it (e.g., “You 
know to say it is one thing, to do it is something else.” (A1665))).    
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evidentiary value of the recording.  But defense counsel for both Appellants declined the 
invitation. 
As Mykhaylo acknowledges, erroneously admitted evidence is harmless if “it is 
highly probable that the improperly admitted evidence did not contribute to the jury’s 
judgment of conviction.”  United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 348 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citing Gov’t of the V.I. v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cr. 1976)).  We again note that a 
RICO conspiracy conviction does not require proof of any overt act (whether within the 
limitations period or not).  See, e.g.¸ Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63.  The government presented 
extensive evidence establishing a continuing pattern of threatening behavior—which 
closely resembled the incidents described by Yashuk and continued after March 17, 2015.  
In short, if the Botsvynyuks were unable to discover the location of an escaped victim 
through the remaining workers, Omelyan would threaten the victim’s relatives in Ukraine 
in order to discover the victim’s location or to recoup the debt that the victim purportedly 
owed them.  Accordingly, “the government presented evidence of an alleged 2009 
incident during which Omelyan . . . visited the home of Olga [H]aramita but was turned 
away.”  (Mykhaylo’s Brief at 14-15.)  Although Omelyan said nothing and Haramita 
testified that she did not know what he would have said, she also claimed that he had 
made repeated threats in the past after her daughter’s escape, e.g., threatening that he 
would find her daughter if she did not return and then either kill her or force her into 
prostitution.  Omelyan called victim Taras Petrunyk’s mother (Svitlana Zaiats) more than 
once, telling her she would never again see her son alive.  According to Zaiats, Omelyan 
threatened to rape Zaiats and burn her house down unless she disclosed her son’s 
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location.  He threatened to kidnap her youngest son and send her one finger at a time until 
she complied.  Given these circumstances, we believe “‘that the judgment was not 
substantially swayed by [the admission of the 2014 recording].’”  United States v. Lopez, 
340 F.3d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Toto, 529 F.2d at 283).  
C. The “Georgian” Telephone Call 
 Mykhaylo challenges the District Court’s admission of Yashuk’s testimony about 
the threatening telephone call she received from either Omelyan using a Georgian accent 
or someone else using such an accent.  According to him, the testimony was inadmissible 
because the witness could not identify the speaker (and accordingly could not satisfy 
Federal Rule of Evidence 901 (“Authenticating or Identifying Evidence”)), and, in the 
absence of such an identification (and a timeframe for the telephone call), it could not be 
determined whether the testimony was admissible as a statement of a co-conspirator 
made in furtherance (and during the existence) of the conspiracy under Rule 
801(d)(2)(E).  However, the “Georgian” threat adequately demonstrated a conspiratorial 
connection between the declarant and Omelyan, and, by extension, with the other 
Botsvynyuk brothers.  See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1081-82 & n.10 
(3d Cir. 1990) (indicating that statement of unidentified declarant suggesting 
conspiratorial connection between declarant and defendants was properly admitted under 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) where totality of circumstances suggested conspiratorial connection 
and that, although unidentifiability may be important, it was not particularly significant 
because statement and surrounding circumstances provided sufficient evidence of 
reliability).  In his reply brief, Mykhaylo acknowledges that “[a] fair reading of the trial 
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record places this alleged call in the 2003 timeframe.”  (Mykhaylo’s Reply Brief at 2 n.5) 
D. The 2011 Threat by the Botsvynyuk Sister 
 The District Court allowed I.S.9 and her husband Mykhaylo Tomiyuk to testify 
about a 2011 visit to their home in Ukraine by the Botsvynyuks’ sister.  According to the 
couple, Pasha Botsvynyuk (“Pasha”) threatened them, and, as a result, they decided to 
return to the United States.  According to Mykhaylo, this evidence constituted hearsay 
that could not have been admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).  We conclude that this 
evidence was properly admitted—not as statements of a co-conspirator—but to explain 
why these witnesses came to the United States in response to the defense’s portrayal of 
the victims as motivated by a desire to obtain legal status   
E. “Climate of Fear” Evidence 
 Both Appellants challenge the admissibility of the “climate of fear” evidence, 
although they rely on different theories to do so.  This evidence was admitted to establish 
the witnesses’ fearful state of mind under Rules 801(c)(1) and 803(3) (and not for the 
truth of the matters asserted).  However, Mykhaylo contends that this evidence does not 
satisfy the personal knowledge requirement.   See Fed. R. Evid. 602.  Churuk argues that 
the District Court erroneously permitted the witnesses to testify to repetitive and 
inflammatory statements regarding the Botsvynyuks’ various crimes, making it 
impossible for the jury to consider such evidence for its ostensibly limited purpose.  In 
addition to attacking the District Court’s jury instruction as too perfunctory, Churuk 
asserts that, “if its goal was truly to establish the existence of a climate of fear, the 
                                              
9 Like M.S.1, I.S. was raped by Mykhaylo.   
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government possessed a clear evidentiary alternative based upon the witnesses’ alleged 
firsthand experience” and that the “ostensible purpose of the out-of-court accusations was 
belied by the government’s own evidence” because all of the witnesses eventually left the 
Botsvynyuks (and continued to live and work illegally in the United States).  (Churuk’s 
Brief at 51 (relying on Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997)).)   
Nevertheless, it appears undisputed that (as Mykhaylo puts it) “evidence along 
these lines may be admissible for a purpose of establishing the witness’s state of mind, as 
opposed to for the truth of the matter asserted” (Mykhaylo’s Brief at 60).  Furthermore, 
the prosecution “may fairly seek to place its evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a 
story of guiltiness as to support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors that a guilty 
verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete elements of a 
defendant’s legal fault.”  Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188 (citing United States v. Gilliam, 994 
F.2d 97, 100-02 (2d Cir. 1993)).  The District Court also instructed the jury more than 
once that this sort of testimony could not be considered for its truth (e.g., “that the 
workers were abused” (A1274)) and instead could only be considered for the limited 
purpose of assessing the witnesses’ state of mind (and why they took or failed to take 
certain actions).  In fact, counsel for both Churuk and Mykhaylo expressed their 
satisfaction with the specific instruction that Churuk now attacks on appeal, and they 
declined the District Court’s invitation to give any additional cautionary instructions in 
the final charge. 
F. Identification 
In 2000, Yelena Shuster was dating Vitaliy Lytvynyuk and accompanied him to a  
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scheduled immigration court appearance in Chicago.   Two men suddenly accosted 
Lytvynyuk and took him away.  In a 2015 photo array, Shuster identified Churuk as one 
of the two men.10  Churuk asserts that the District Court abused its discretion by denying 
his motion to suppress the photographic identification evidence.11  We believe that the 
District Court appropriately disposed of his motion on the grounds that Shuster’s 
identification of Churuk was not unduly suggestive.  
“A due process violation can result when an identification procedure is so 
suggestive that it undermines the reliability of the resulting identification.”  United States 
v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2003).  This inquiry implicates a two-step 
process.  “The first question is whether the initial identification was ‘unnecessarily’ or 
‘impermissibly’ suggestive.”  United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1389 (3d Cir. 
1991).  If the procedure is found to have been unnecessarily suggestive, the second 
question is whether it was so conducive to mistaken identification or gave rise to such a 
substantial likelihood of misidentification that the admission of the identification would 
constitute a denial of due process.  Id.; see also, e.g., Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 
503 (3d Cir. 2005). 
The District Court appropriately disposed of Churuk’s motion based on the 
threshold “suggestiveness” prong.  According to Churuk, “[e]ven the trial court was 
                                              
10 Shuster identified Bogdan Pulyk as the other man.  Pulyk was deceased at the 
time of trial.    
11 We review a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of identification 
testimony for an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 
137 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that when motion to suppress has been denied findings of fact 
are reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions are assessed under plenary standard). 
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constrained to admit that the [photo array] fillers bore no resemblance to Mr. Churuk,” 
and “Appellant’s picture stood out from the others because it was taken at a greater 
distance from the camera than the other photos and because it was more ‘grainy’ than the 
others.”  (Churuk’s Brief at 35 (citing JA1448) (footnote omitted).)  But the District 
Court acknowledged that there were some small differences in perspective between the 
photographs and that two of the individuals appeared to be closer to the camera.  It 
appropriately determined that, “although I would not say these guys could all be brothers, 
. . . I don’t think that’s the standard.”  (A1448).  In its written disposition, the District 
Court properly explained that the men in two of the six photographs in the array (the 
photographs specifically challenged below by the defense) bore sufficient resemblance to 
Churuk.  There were no significant differences in the size, format, angle, or overall 
appearance of the photographs.  “A photographic array is not unnecessarily suggestive 
solely because certain characteristics of a defendant or photograph set him apart from the 
other persons pictured in the array.”12  United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 133-34 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (citing Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 260 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Dowling, 946 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1988)).   
F. Jury Instructions and the Statute of Limitations 
According to Mykhaylo, “[t]he District Court erred when it instructed the jury on 
the statute of limitations charge issue by shifting the burden of proof to Appellants, 
                                              
12 Especially given the District Court’s specific findings, we do not accept 
Churuk’s suggestion that the District Court’s purportedly “cheeky” comment that “I 
would not say these guys could all be brothers” somehow constituted a finding that the 
other photographs did not bear a substantial resemblance to Churuk.   
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inviting the jury to consider inadmissible evidence when considering the issue and 
suggesting a continuing conspiracy when the conspiracy was long complete.”13  
(Mykhaylo’s Brief at 40 (emphasis omitted).)  The District Court did not commit a 
reversible error with respect to its jury instruction on the statute of limitations. 
Mykhaylo specifically attacks the following sentence in the final jury charge:  
“‘For RICO conspiracy, once the Government meets its burden of proof to establish the 
conspiracy, it is entitled to a presumption that the conspiracy continued to exist until 
[Appellants] demonstrate otherwise.’”  (Id. at 44 (citing A1992-A1993).)  According to 
Mykhaylo, the District Court (as well as the government) “seems to have confused the 
burden of proof governing the issue of a defendant’s withdrawal from a conspiracy with 
the parties’ respective burden of proof concerning the statute of limitations.”  (Id.)  
Unlike the general conspiracy offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 371, RICO conspiracy does not 
require proof of any overt act.  See, e.g., Salinas, 552 U.S. at 63.  Accordingly, the 
prosecution need not prove that an overt act occurred within the limitations period.  
However, “the Government must prove the time of the conspiracy offense if a statute-of-
limitations defense is raised.”  Smith, 568 U.S. at 113 (citing Grunewald v. United States¸ 
353 U.S. 391, 396 (1957)).  This burden is satisfied if the prosecution proves that the 
conspiracy “continued past the statute-of-limitations period.”  Id.  “For the offense in 
                                              
13 We consider whether the charge as a whole fairly and adequately submitted 
issues in the case to the jury.  See, e.g., United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264 
(3d Cir. 1995). The Court exercises plenary review to determine whether the instructions 
stated the proper legal standard and whether it improperly shifted the burden of proof.   
See, e.g., United States v. Korey, 472 F.3d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 2007); Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 
1260-64.  
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these conspiracy prosecutions was not the initial act of agreement, but the banding-
together against the law effected by the act, which continues until termination of the 
conspiracy or, as to a particular defendant, until the defendant’s withdrawal.”  Id.  In turn, 
“the burden of establishing withdrawal rests upon the defendant.”  Id. “Here, Appellants 
have not alleged withdrawal from or renunciation of the charged conspiracy.  Instead, 
Appellants asserted and continue to assert the government failed to prove any conduct 
occurring within the limitations period.”  (Mykhaylo’s Reply Brief at 8.)  According to 
Mykhaylo, the government had the burden to prove such conspiratorial conduct occurred 
within the limitations period, and the District Court committed reversible error by 
shifting this burden of proof to the defense. 
The District Court’s statute-of-limitations instruction, considered in its entirety, 
did not improperly shift the applicable burden of proof.   
“The district court instructed the jury that to find the indictment was timely filed, 
it must ‘determine from all the evidence whether the conspiracy continued to exist 
between March 17th, 2005 and the indictment date, March 17th, 2010.’”  (Mykhaylo’s 
Brief at 40-41 (quoting A1991).)  “[T]he Government can establish the continuation of 
the conspiracy” with evidence that any acts of any one or more of the alleged types of 
racketeering activities (i.e., peonage, involuntary servitude, extortion, and immigration 
violations) at issue in this case “continued” within the five-year period.  (A1991).  After 
summarizing “some of the discreet evidence the government ‘argue[d] that it presented’ 
to prove the conspiracy continued ‘well beyond March 17th, 2005’” (Mykhaylo’s Brief at 
41 (quoting A1991)), the District Court then provided the jury with a thorough 
18 
 
explanation of what was required to satisfy the statute of limitations: 
The limitations period begins to be calculated only when the crime is 
complete.  For RICO conspiracy, this does not occur until the purposes of 
the conspiracy [have] either been accomplished or abandoned.  The 
Government alleges that the purposes of the charged conspiracy were not 
accomplished or abandoned until at least 2009 because debts of some of the 
alleged victims of the Botsvynyuk organization remained outstanding after 
March 17th, 2005. 
   
It is not required that the Government prove an overt act within the 
five-year period.  Although you may consider any such overt acts in 
making your determination.  If you find that the goals of the conspiracy had 
not yet been accomplished or abandoned as of March 17th, 2005, then you 
can find that the indictment was timely filed.   
 
For RICO conspiracy, once the Government meets its burden of 
proof to establish the conspiracy, it is entitled to a presumption that the 
conspiracy continued to exist until the defendants demonstrate otherwise. 
 
Conspiracy is a continuing offense and you may consider each and 
all of any of the conspirators’ actions in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
providing the conspiracy continued into the limitations period, until there is 
some affirmative showing that it has ended or that all its members have 
withdrawn. 
 
(A1992-A1993.)  
 The District Court did not relieve the government of its burden of proving the 
existence and time-frame of the conspiracy.  It appears well established that a RICO 
conspiracy constitutes a continuing offense that is not complete until its purposes have 
either been accomplished or abandoned.  See, e.g., United States v. Yanotti, 541 F.3d 
112, 123 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Saadey, 393 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Manna v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1168 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Mykhaylo relies on the commentary to the 
Third Circuit model jury instructions, which explains that, while the defendant bears the 
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burden of proving withdrawal, “the Court in Smith acknowledged, however, that ‘we 
have held that the Government must prove the time of the conspiracy offense if a statute-
of-limitations defense is raised.’”  3d Cir. Model Criminal Jury Instruction 8.01 cmt. 
(quoting Smith, 568 U.S. at 113); see also, e.g., 3d Cir. Model Criminal Jury Instruction 
6.18.1962D cmt. (observing that, although RICO conspiracy does not include an overt act 
element, federal courts otherwise apply traditional conspiracy principles and a district 
judge should give instructions applicable to conspiracy generally, including, if raised by 
defense, instruction for withdrawal).  We note that, like the District Court, the model 
instructions also recognize that “[a] conspiracy ends when the objectives of the 
conspiracy have been achieved or when all members have withdrawn from it.” 3d Cir. 
Model Criminal Jury Instruction 6.18.371I.  “[A] conspiracy may be a continuing 
conspiracy and if it is, it lasts until there is some affirmative showing that it has ended or 
that all of its members have withdrawn.”  Id. (further stating that conspiracy may be 
continuing if agreement includes understanding conspiracy will continue over time or 
conspiracy has continuing purpose or objective).   
We also note that the District Court’s language was actually based on Second 
Circuit case law, specifically United States v. Spero, 331 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“Accordingly, once the Government met its burden of proof by establishing that the 
loansharking conspiracy existed, it was entitled to a presumption that the conspiracy 
continued until defendant demonstrated otherwise.”).  Mykhaylo attempts to distinguish 
the cases cited by the government on the grounds that they largely involved “withdrawal 
from conspiracies as opposed to failure of proof.”  (Mykhaylo’s Reply Brief at 7).  
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However, Spero’s reasoning clearly implicated both concepts (e.g., “‘[w]here a 
conspiracy contemplates a continuity of purpose and a continued performance of acts, it 
is presumed to exist until there has been affirmative showing that it has been 
terminated[,] and its members continue to be conspirators until there has been an 
affirmative showing that they have withdrawn,’” id. at 60 (quoting United States v. 
Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 642 (6th Cir. 1975) (alterations and emphasis in the original)).  
Spero himself failed to prove that the objectives of the conspiracy were accomplished 
before the limitations period (and also did not establish that he abandoned the conspiracy 
before that date).14  Id. at 60-61. 
According to Mykhaylo, “the district court instructed the jury that in determining 
the statute of limitations issue, it should consider specific post-March 17, 2005 instances 
of conduct.”  (Mykhaylo’s Brief at 47.)  The District Court reminded the jury that: 
The Government argues that it has presented evidence that the 
conspiracy continued well beyond March 17th, 2005.  Including in the 
evidence the Government has offered is the following: 
 
One.  Evidence that from in or around spring 2005 to in and around 
spring 2006, Omelyan Botsvynyuk visited Nadia Yashuk in Ukraine and 
threatened to take her granddaughter to a brothel. 
 
Two.  Evidence that from in or around spring 2005 to in or around 
spring 2006, Omelyan Botsvynyuk visited Nadia Yashuk and threatened 
her a second time. 
 
Three.  Evidence that in or around the spring of 2007, in Ukraine, 
Omelyan Botsvynyuk asked Nadia Yashuk about the whereabouts of her 
son. 
  
                                              
14 In fact, Mykhaylo acknowledges that “the government correctly summarizes one 
portion of Spero’s holding.”  (Mykhaylo’s Reply Brief at 7.)    
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And four.  Evidence that in or around 2009, Omelyan Botsvynyuk 
visited the home of Olga [H]aramita but was turned away. 
 
(A1991-A1992.)   Mykhaylo argues that this language permitted the jury to consider 
other conduct as evidence that the conspiracy continued to exist beyond March 17, 2005, 
including Pasha’s confrontation with I.S. and Tomiyuk and (especially) the recording of 
the 2014 telephone call Omelyan made to Yashuk.  We believe that he has read too much 
into the District Court’s jury charge.  We have already explained that this evidence was 
properly admitted for other limited purposes (and not to establish that the conspiracy 
continued into the limitations period).  In fact, the defense turned down the District 
Court’s express invitation to provide a cautionary instruction in the final charge regarding 
the 2014 recording.  We also do not agree that the jury should have been required to 
reach a unanimous verdict as to which specific incidents it found had occurred within the 
limitations period.  The statute of limitations is not an element of the offense but an 
affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant or it is waived (and a RICO 
conspiracy conviction does not require proof of any overt act either within or before the 
limitations period).  See, e.g.¸ Smith, 568 U.S. at 111-12; Salinas, 552 U.S. at 63.  
Mykhaylo does not cite to any case stating that the jury must make unanimous findings 
regarding which conspiratorial acts, if any, occurred within the limitations period. 
 Finally, the District Court did not commit reversible error by suggesting to the jury 
that the conspiracy was still in existence at the time of trial.  Mykhaylo takes issue with 
the District Court’s instruction concerning unpaid debts:  “The Government alleges that 
the purposes of the charged conspiracy were not accomplished or abandoned until at least 
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2009 because debts of some of the alleged victims of the Botsvynyuk organization 
remained outstanding after March 17th, 2005.”  (A1992.)   The extortionate collection of 
debts was a purpose of the charged conspiracy, and each act to collect on an allegedly 
outstanding debt would then serve to further the conspiracy.  In contrast, the subsequent 
payments or other conduct at issue in the two decisions cited by Mykhaylo did not further 
the original conspiracies. See United States v. Grimm, 738 F.3d 498, 501-04 (2d Cir. 
2013); United States v. Bornman, 559 F.3d 150, 152-55 (3d Cir. 2009). 
G. Constructive Amendment and Variance 
 Mykhaylo similarly argues that the jury instructions and the government’s 
arguments constructively amended the alleged timeframe of the conspiracy.  According 
to him, the indictment alleged a conspiracy with discrete temporal parameters—“[f]rom 
at least the fall of 2000 through in or around the spring of 2007” (A110)—and alleged 
several discrete acts within the limitations period (i.e., the 2005/2006 and 2007 incidents 
involving Omelyan and Yashuk).  However, the government purportedly introduced 
evidence of additional post-2007 conduct (i.e., the 2009 Haramita incident, the 2011 
Pasha confrontation, and the 2014 Omelyan telephone recording) “which dramatically 
implicated and altered the jury’s consideration of the statute of limitations issue” 
(Mykhaylo’s Brief at 54).  Mykhaylo further contends that the District Court’s 
instructions (especially the language regarding unpaid debts) impermissibly altered the 
temporal parameters of the indictment.  In short, the District Court and the government 
purportedly turned an alleged conspiracy with a specific end date into an open-ended 
“outstanding debts” scheme that continues to exist.  Mykhaylo also argues that, even if 
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the modification did not rise to the level of constructive amendment, it constituted a 
prejudicial variance (and that the defense’s failure to articulate a cogent theory of 
prejudice at the charging conference was itself a result of surprise).   
 The indictment was not constructively amended.15  “An indictment is 
constructively amended when, in the absence of a formal amendment, the evidence and 
jury instructions at trial modify essential terms of the charged offense in such a way that 
there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have convicted the defendant for an 
offense differing from the offense the indictment returned by the grand jury actually 
charged.”  United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2006) (footnote 
omitted) (citing United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 140 (1985)); see also, e.g., United 
States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2007) (“An indictment is constructively 
amended when evidence, arguments, or the district court’s jury instructions effectively 
‘amend[s] the indictment by broadening the possible bases for conviction from that which 
appear in the indictment.’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 208 (3d Cir. 
2004) (alterations in the original)).  As the government explains, “[t]he evidence 
regarding ‘debts’ owed to the defendants was proof of the charged predicate offenses and 
showed their motive for extorting the victims and their families.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 
93.)  The indictment accordingly identified the purposes of their conspiracy as enriching 
the members and associates of the Botsvynyuk Organization through, among other 
things, human trafficking, harboring illegal aliens, unlawful conduct with respect to 
                                              
15 We exercise plenary review to determine whether there was either a constructive 
amendment or a variance.  See, e.g., United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 
2006).   
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passports and immigration documents, and forced human labor.  It then alleged that the 
pattern of racketeering activity consisted of four types of acts, including extortion.  “The 
attempts to collect the ‘debts’ of the victims and extortionate conduct that was used to do 
so was part of and furthered the purposes of the racketeering conspiracy.”  (Id. at 94.)  
Although considering evidence that occurred “before the timeframe alleged in the 
Indictment” and observing that proof of the acts charged in the indictment within the 
statute of limitations and before the return of the indictment is sufficient to support the 
conviction (Mykhaylo’s Reply Brief at 11), this Court still concluded that a time variance 
between the indictment’s allegations and proof at trial did not rise to the level of a 
constructive amendment or prejudicial variance because the time of the offense does not 
constitute an element under the Hobbs or the Travel Acts.  United States v. Somers¸496 
F.2d 724, 742-46 (3d Cir. 1974)).  As Mykhaylo acknowledges in his reply brief, the 
statute of limitations is not an element of the offense of RICO conspiracy.  See, 
e.g.¸Smith¸568 U.S. at 111-12.16   
 It is well established that a variance occurs when “the evidence at trial proves facts 
materially different from those alleged in the indictment.”  (Mykhaylo’s Brief at 55 
(citing McKee, 506 F.3d at 231 n.7).)  In this case, “the indictment clearly stated that . . .  
the victims incurred ‘debts’ by being smuggled into the United States, that the defendants 
used these ‘debts’ to maintain the victims in conditions of peonage and involuntary 
servitude, and [that] the defendants used extortionate threats and acts against the victims 
                                              
16 We yet again reiterate that the 2009 Pasha confrontation as well as the 2014 
recording were not admitted as evidence that the conspiracy itself continued into the 
limitations period.     
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and their families in Ukraine to collect these owed ‘debts.’”  (Appellee’s Brief at 96).  
Defense counsel were also unable to articulate how their clients were prejudiced when 
asked to do so during the charging conference by the District Court (with Mykhaylo’s 
attorney even admitting that he knew of the evidence and that he was not surprised by it 
but claiming prejudice “by including something in the charge that I don’t believe is 
required to be in the charge” (A1923)).   
H. Recusal 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Churuk’s motion for 
recusal.17 
 “Biases stemming from facts gleaned during judicial proceedings themselves must 
be particularly strong in order to merit recusal.”  United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 574 
(3d Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 
2001).  “[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events 
occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not 
constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated 
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”  Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).  Churuk focuses on two types of statements made by 
the District Court at Stepan’s restitution hearing:  (1) “Based on facts gleaned from the 
trial of Stepan Botsvynyuk -- and before even hearing the defense case in this matter -- 
the Court has already labeled defendants Yaroslav Churuk and Mykhaylo Botsvynyuk as 
                                              
17 We review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., 
Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 2004).  
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tyrants and slave traders who pushed their alleged victims to work ‘ungodly’ hours;” and 
(2) “In addition, the Court has made statements indicating that if defendants Yaroslav 
Churuk and Mykhaylo Botsvynyuk are convicted, it believes that they should be jointly 
and severally liable for $288,272 in restitution despite the fact that the Court could 
exercise its discretion to take the more lenient course of apportioning restitution 
according to culpability.”  (Churuk’s Brief at 54.)  However, the District Judge 
appropriately explained that his comments at Stepan’s restitution hearing were a fair 
summary of the evidence presented regarding the uncompensated work performed by the 
Botsvynyuk Organization’s victims, and he acknowledged his discretion in apportioning 
liability.  Churuk compares the comments regarding restitution liability to the statements 
made by the district judge in Antar.  But the District Judge here did not tell the parties “in 
stark, plain, and unambiguous language” that “his goal in the criminal case, from the 
beginning, was something other than what it should have been,” i.e., “to enforce a 
repatriation order and final judgment issued during a concurrent civil proceeding and give 
back the proceeds recovered to the public.”  Antar, 53 F.3d at 576. 
I. Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness 
Finally, we reject Mykhaylo’s challenge of the procedural as well as the 
substantive reasonableness of his sentence.18 
                                              
18  We exercise plenary review of a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and review its factual findings for clear error.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  If there is no procedural error, the 
Court reviews for substantive unreasonableness and will reverse if no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence for the reasons the district court 
provided.  See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011).   
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As to procedural reasonableness, Mykhaylo contends that the District Court 
“erroneously assumed [he] should be held accountable for conduct relating to 
peonage/involuntary servitude, disregarding the general verdict that the jury returned.”  
(Mykhaylo’s Brief at 63.)  He argues that the District Court should have applied U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.2(d), which states that, for a charge of conspiracy to commit more than one 
offense, the conviction “shall be treated as if the defendant had been convicted on a 
separate count of conspiracy for each offense that the defendants conspired to commit.”  
In cases where the jury returns a general verdict, § 1B1.2(d) requires the sentencing court 
to determine whether it would find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
conspiring to commit the particular object offense.  See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 cmt. n.4; 
United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 163-69 (3d Cir. 1996).  However, every circuit 
court to have considered the issue (with one exception) has concluded that this 
framework does not apply in the context of RICO conspiracy.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Barragan, 871 F.3d 689, 715-19 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Garcia, 754 F.3d 460, 
482-83 (7th Cir. 2014); United Sates v. Massino, 546 F.3d 123, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 541-42 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 74-80 (1st Cir. 1993).  But see, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, 255 
F.3d 1335, 1340-42 (11th Cir. 2001).  They have adopted this approach because, unlike 
the general conspiracy statute that permits charging multiple objects, RICO conspiracy 
constitutes a “single object” offense (the object being to engage in racketeering).  See, 
e.g.¸Barragan, 871 F.3d at 717.  In turn, the record in this case supports the finding that 
Mykhaylo should be held responsible for more than just the immigration offenses (for 
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instance, the evidence established that he ran his own work crew and was aware his 
brothers were doing the same).  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (observing that, in context 
of jointly undertaken criminal activity, relevant conduct includes, inter alia, reasonably 
foreseeable acts and omission of others within scope of and in furtherance of jointly 
undertaken criminal activity occurring during commission of offense of conviction).  
 The District Court also purportedly committed procedural error when it refused to 
apply the appropriate downward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 on account of 
Mykhaylo’s allegedly mitigated role in the offense.  But he acknowledges that “‘a 
defendant may receive an adjustment under the guideline if he or she is substantially less 
culpable than the average participant in the criminal activity.’”  (Mykhaylo’s Brief at 69 
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C)) (emphasis omitted)).)  The District Court neither 
misinterpreted the Guidelines nor committed a clear error when it found that Mykhaylo 
was not substantially less culpable than his brothers.    
 According to Mykhaylo, the sentence was substantively unreasonable because no 
reasonable court would have sentenced him to 240 months in prison (a sentence at the 
statutory maximum where the calculated Guidelines range was 151 to 188 months) and 
this sentence was greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.  As the government succinctly explains, “the evidence 
established that [Mykhaylo] was a knowing and voluntary member of the criminal 
enterprise who”—recruited workers in Ukraine under false pretenses, obtained visas and 
passports for them, smuggled the workers into the United States, eventually traveled to 
this country to manage his own crew of workers, and observed and participated in 
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beatings and other criminal conduct to keep the workers in line and secure their continued 
labor as part of the scheme.  (Appellee’s Brief at 117.)  In such circumstances, the 
District Court did not commit reversible error by sentencing Mykhaylo to the statutory 
maximum. 
III.       
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court.   
